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A Tale of Two Cities: The Need for Greater Federal
Involvement to Ensure Proper Notification, Medical
Monitoring and Treatment, and Successful Relocation
for Tallevast, Florida and Other Environmental Justice
Communities
Sabrina R. Collins
Abstract
This article explores the environmental justice battles being waged
in two Florida communities. The first is in Pensacola at the site of the
infamous “Mount Dioxin” and the second is in Tallevast. The article
further examines the treatment of the two communities by the local, state
and federal governments. Further insight is also provided regarding the
affected communities. The article offers suggestions for fair and
effective treatment of environmental justice communities.
Sabrina R. Collins is a recent graduate of Florida A&M University College of Law
where she was an International Human Rights Law Fellow in the Center for
International Law and Justice. She has her MA in African Diaspora Studies from
Florida International University and her BA in African American Studies from Emory
University. Her primary interests are international human rights, environmental justice
and civil rights.
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Introduction
Florida is considered by many to be a paradise. Beautiful beaches
and foliage combine with mild weather conditions to make Floridians
the envy of many. However, for many of its residents, especially those
who live in environmental justice communities, life is anything but a
leisurely stroll on the beach. Florida’s environmental justice communi-
ties demonstrate the intersection of race and environmentalism that cre-
ates the relatively new phenomenon known as the environmental justice
movement.
In the small hamlet town of Tallevast, the residents are currently
battling toxic contamination, poor health, and seemingly undefeatable
opponents- the state of Florida and multibillion dollar corporation
Lockheed Martin. The residents of Tallevast have fought hard against
disregard and discrimination. However, they are growing weary after
years of battle. There are lessons from within the state of Florida that
may be relevant to Tallevast’s situation as possible guidance for success.
The case of “Mount Dioxin” was heralded as a major accomplish-
ment which was heralded as a “pilot” for other relocation efforts by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). However, the roadmap that
could have been referenced for guidance in Tallevast has been blocked.
The deference that the EPA has shown to the Florida Department of
Environmental Protection (FDEP) has resulted in a level of deference to
Lockheed Martin which has granted the corporation wide, if not
absolute, discretion in its handling of the cleanup process in Tallevast.
The first part of the proposed solution for these environmental justice
communities is that the oversight of the cleanup and remediation of con-
taminated communities should be removed from the hands of the state
of Florida and given to the Federal government so as to ensure the most
impartial treatment possible.
The second part of the proposal for the Tallevast community in-
volves the use of the information that has been gathered regarding
relocation in EJ communities. By the EPA’s own label, Mount Dioxin
was to be a pilot study. There is no need to “reinvent the wheel.” The
EPA can take the information that was collected from the formal studies
and roundtable discussions to fashion a remedy for the people of
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Tallevast and force the responsible party, in this case Lockheed Martin,
to follow the plan.
Part I of this article explores the impact of environmental contami-
nation on two environmental justice communities in Florida. First, the
background of the environmental justice movement as well as an under-
standing of the environmental justice framework is considered in order
to provide a foundation for the consideration of the social and legal pro-
cesses at work in environmental justice communities. After considering
that framework, the histories of Tallevast and Escambia County and
their struggles against environmental racism will be considered.
Part II of the article provides a brief overview of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA). Part III of the article discusses proposals for proper
treatment of environmental justice communities and focuses on the ap-
plication of the lessons learned from Escambia County to the problems
of Tallevast, Florida. Specifically, the article addresses issues of notifi-
cation, medical monitoring and treatment and successful relocation and
calls for specific procedures to be followed so as to ensure the best pos-
sible treatment and outcome for the community members. The process
of overfiling is suggested as a means by which to limit the power of the
local and regional authorities.
I. Environmental Contamination Impacts in Two Environmental
Justice Communities
An understanding of the Environmental Justice Movement in the
United States necessitates the consideration of the historical trajectory of
the movement and its development as a response to intolerable racism
and oppression that have been levied at poor and minority communities.
In Environmental Justice in the New Millennium, Filomina Steady
discusses The Dominant Economic Development Paradigm in relation to
Environmental Justice.1 Steady explains how the pursuit of “limitless
economic growth and the domination of nature to ensure such growth”
has been the prevailing paradigm for development for centuries.2
1 See FILOMINA STEADY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM:
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON RACE, ETHNICITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 5 (Palgrave
Macmillian ed., 2009).
2 Id.
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While the origins of the Environmental Justice Movement have of-
ten been traced to the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s.3 Steady
connects the contemporary struggles of environmental justice communi-
ties to the beginnings of the present-day African Diaspora which came
into being as the result of European expansionism “as exemplified by
the transatlantic slave trade and the imperialism that greatly shaped the
Americas.”4
This ideology of domination, exploitation and disregard for life can
be traced throughout the history of imperialistic conquest of Africa and
the Americas. Accounts of slavery indicate that enslaved people lived in
“environmentally dangerous and squalid conditions.”5 The historical
treatment of Native Americans and Blacks contributed to the ideology of
domination and disregard that has persisted, in various forms, to the
present where the process continues through “multinational corporations
and international financial institutions.”6 This paradigm has led to an
allocation of benefits and burdens that has been disproportionately
unfavorable to poor communities and communities of color.
The environmental justice frame is built upon the examples, actions
and rhetoric of past social justice movements, most notably the Civil
Rights Movement.7 The Civil Rights Movement, of course, was in-
fluenced by a host of previous social justice movements, and in turn,
provided the foundation for numerous other movements for rights. The
movement for environmental justice fits squarely into this frame of
reference.
A. Background of the Environmental Justice Movement
3 See id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 6.
6 Id.
7 Stella M. Capek, The “Environmental Justice” Frame: A Conceptual
Discussion and an Application, 40 SOC. PROBLEMS 8 (1993), available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3097023.
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The Environmental Justice Movement started in Warren County,
North Carolina.8 During the summer of 1978, 31,000 gallons of used oil
contaminated with hazardous chemicals known as polychlorinated bi-
phenyl (PCBs) were dumped on the side of roadways throughout North
Carolina.9 Two hundred and ten miles of roadways were affected.10
PCBs are man-made organic chemicals, the manufacturing of which was
banned in 1979.11 PCBs have been demonstrated to cause cancer, as well
as a variety of other adverse health effects on the immune system, re-
productive system, nervous system, and endocrine system.12
Robert J. Burns, the owner and operator of a New York based
waste hauling company, had obtained the contaminated oil from the
Ward Transfer Company.13 Apparently, Mr. Burns has purchased the
contaminated oil without having been informed of the proposed ban on
PCBs. Rather than face the expense of properly disposing of the toxins,
Burns dumped the oil on North Carolina roadsides. The Environmental
Protection Agency designated the contaminated roadsides as Superfund
sites and worked with the state of North Carolina to devise a plan to
collect the PCBs from the 14 counties where they had been dumped and
to deposit them in a landfill.
Former Governor James B. Hunt decided that a rural town by the
name of Afton, in Warren County, would be the site of the new
landfill.14 Afton was 84% African American and had neither a mayor
nor a city council.15 Of the 100 counties in the state of North Carolina,
8 The Beginning of the Environmental Justice Movement, Environmental Justice
in North Carolina, DUKEUNIVERSITY, http://sites.duke.edu/docst110s_01_s2011_sb211
/what-is-environmental-justice/history/ (last visited April 27, 2014); see also Jennifer
Wyatt, The Birth of the Environmental Justice Movement Was In Warren County,
ROADSTOJUSTICE.ORG (May 9, 2011), available at http://www.roadstojustice.org/the-
birth-of-the-environmental-justice-movement-in-warren-county.
9 See id.
10 Robert Bullard, Environmental Racism PCB Landfill Finally Remedied But No
Reparations for Residents, ENVTL. JUSTICE RES. CENTER (Jan. 12, 2004), available at
http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/warren%20county%20rdb.htm.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Basic Information: Polychlorinated Biphenyls, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/epawaste/hazard/tsd/pcbs/pubs/about.htm (last visited April 27,
2014).
14 While it is agreed that the site of the landfill was in Warren County, some
sources cite the city of Shocco, NC, while others cite the city of Afton, NC.
15 DUKEUNIVERSITY, supra note 8.
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Warren County had the highest majority of African Americans and was
ranked 97th in Gross Domestic Product (GDP).16
Rather than quietly accepting the contamination and stigma that
had literally been dumped on them, the residents of Warren County
organized themselves into a grass-roots force that was not to be ignored.
The Warren County citizens were later joined by civil rights leaders,
black church groups, and youth and environmental activists that engaged
in protests and demonstrations resulting in the arrests of over 500
people.17
While the protests did not stop the trucks from dumping toxic waste
in the community, Warren County gained national attention and prompt-
ed the General Accounting Office (GAO) to conduct a study into the
siting of hazardous waste sites and the demographics of the communities
surrounding those landfills. The 1983 GAO study reported that three of
the four communities with hazardous waste landfills in EPA Region IV
were located in predominately black communities. Additionally, at least
twenty-six percent of the population in all four communities had in-
comes below the poverty level.18
The Warren County protests also led to the “Toxic Waste and Race
Report” which was produced by the United Church of Christ Commis-
sion for Racial Justice in 1987.19 The Report was the “first national re-
port to comprehensively document the presence of hazardous wastes in
racial and ethnic communities throughout the United States.”20 Also, it
explored the concept of “environmental racism” and provided the basis
for understanding the interplay of civil rights struggles and environmen-
talism that created the Environmental Justice Movement.
While the specific circumstances of the communities may differ,
the call for environmental justice consolidates the “analogous experi-
ences” of many communities into a force with significant mobilizing
power at both the local and national levels.21 In 1991, the People of
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Bullard, supra note 10.
19 Id.
20 Id. at ix.
21 Capek, supra note 7, at 5.
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Color Environmental Leadership Summit convened in Washington D.C.
with the goal of building an international movement of people commit-
ted to fighting the destruction and taking of lands in the communities of
color.22 At this summit, the seventeen “Principles of Environmental
Justice” were drafted.
The Preamble gives definition and focus to the goals of the
movement by stating that the attendees and all those whom they
represented sought “to promote economic alternatives which would
contribute to the development of environmentally safe livelihoods; and,
to secure our political, economic and cultural liberation that has been
denied for over 500 years of colonization and oppression, resulting in
the poisoning of our communities and land and the genocide of our
peoples… .”23 These principles formed a framework that is comprised of
specific claims that reflect the unique character of environmental
grievances.
These claims include the right to (1) accurate information about the
situation; (2) a prompt, respectful, and unbiased hearing when contami-
nation claims are made; (3) democratic participation in deciding the
future of the contaminated community; and (4) compensation from
parties who have inflicted injuries on the victims.24 Capek also identifies
a fifth component which serves not as a right, but rather an informal
expectation, which is the commitment to solidarity with victims of toxic
contamination in other communities.25 Additionally, Capek identifies a
call to abolish environmental racism as an increasingly significant
element of the environmental justice frame.26
Environmental justice movements must contend with numerous ob-
stacles. First, the members are normally of lower socio-economic
standing and are usually minorities.27 The members are normally short
on time and money. These are often working people with families, or in
many cases, older people who are suffering from the effects of the con-
tamination in their community. The time and effort that is necessary to
mobilize neighbors, form a community organization, educate themselves
22 FIRST NATIONAL PEOPLE OF COLOR ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP SUMMIT,
PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (1991), available at http://www.ejnet.org/
ej/principles.html.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 8.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See id.
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and their community about the contamination, solicit outside help, and
wage legal battles is overwhelming and daunting. Moreover, at a social-
psychological level, studies of contaminated communities reveal the
devastating impact of real or suspected contamination on residents.28
B. Two Affected Environmental Justice Communities
There are approximately seventy Superfund sites in the state of
Florida. Three were added in 2012 and one additional site is being pro-
posed for addition to the list. 29 Florida is located in the United States
Environmental Protection Agency’s (USEPA) Region IV, which is
comprised of eight Southern states.30 Region IV has particular environ-
mental justice concerns that are the direct result of the region’s history
of slavery, Jim Crow laws, segregation, and continued racism. Indeed, it
is no surprise that the environmental justice movement began in Region
IV.31
Two Florida environmental justice communities- one located in
Pensacola and the other in Tallevast- have gained a great deal of atten-
tion due to their environmental justice struggles. Yet, the injustice
continues in each of these communities. The respective stories of the
communities are characterized by tenacity and inspiration as well as
disappointment and frustration. However, both communities provide in-
valuable lessons for ongoing and future environmental justice battles.
This article specifically focuses on the lessons that can be drawn from
Escambia County as possible guidance for the problems in Tallevast.
1. The Rough Side of the Mountain: “Mount Dioxin”
Escambia County, Florida
28 See id.
29 Superfund Sites, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/region4/
superfund/sites/sites.html#fl (last visited Nov. 17, 2012).
30 Region IV is comprised of Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and Florida. Id.
31 Michelle Chen, The Quest for Environmental Justice in Dixie, COLORLINES:
NEWS FOR ACTION (Oct. 29, 2009), http://colorlines.com/archives/2009/10
/the_quest_for_environmental_ju.html.
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Escambia County is the westernmost county in the state of Florida.
In fact, part of the county is actually inside Alabama state lines. The
Escambia county seat, Pensacola, is the site of a remarkable environ-
mental justice community that fought valiantly to obtain permanent
relocation away from toxic contamination. The relocation was heralded
as a great success by the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). The residents were indeed successful in obtaining relo-
cation away from the main source of toxins. However, closer
consideration of the relocation reveals poor handling and lack of consid-
eration in the treatment of the residents. Nevertheless, there are lessons
to be learned from the battles waged by the Escambia County environ-
mental justice community that may applied to future environmental
justice struggles.
The notorious Mount Dioxin was a literal mountain of contamina-
tion that loomed over the community for years, spewing toxins and
carcinogens into the community and causing abnormal rates of cancer
and other illnesses.32 Escambia County was the site of several heavy
polluters. Most notably, and notoriously, were the Escambia Treating
Company, a twenty-six acre wood treating facility and the Agrico
Chemical Company, a thirty-six acre facility which produced chemical
fertilizers.33 These companies were located within 1,000 feet of each
other, with homes nestled between them and surrounding them.34
The Agrico Chemical Company was the site of agrichemical ferti-
lizer production from 1889 until 1975.35 The term agrichemical, a
variant of agrochemical, refers to a broad range of chemicals used in
agriculture and usually includes pesticides, herbicides, insecticides, and
fungicides.36 Agrichemicals also include high concentrations of animal
manure. Many agrichemicals are toxic, and agrichemicals in bulk stor-
age may pose significant environmental and/or health risks.37
32 Steve Lerner, Pensacola, Florida: Living Next Door To Mount Dioxin and a
Chemical Fertilizer Superfund Site, THE COLLABORATIVE ON HEALTH AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (Nov. 30, 2007), available at http://www.healthandenvironment.org/
articles/homepage/2628,
33 Id.
34 See id.
35 Agrico Chemical Company, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
region4/superfund/sites/npl/florida/agricchemfl.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
36 Wikipedia, Agrichemical, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agrochemical (last
visited Nov. 17, 2012).
37 Id.
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Beginning in 1889, the site was used to produce sulfuric acid from
pyrite (iron sulfide).38 Various companies used the site to produce chem-
ical fertilizer from 1920 to 1975, including Agrico, which purchased the
site in 1972. The site is located just 1.5 miles west of Bayou Texar,
which was a discharge site for the contaminated plume that resulted
from the activities at the Agrico site and other adjacent Superfund
sites.39 The Agrico site also polluted an aquifer that is adjacent to Bayou
Texar.40
There is not a great deal of information available about the opera-
tions at the Agrico site. However, what is known is that industrial
wastewater was discharged into low-lying areas and unlined ponds on
the property.41 In 1989, the EPA placed the Agrico site on the National
Priorities List because of the contaminated ground water, sludge and
soil.42 The listed contaminants of concern at the Agrico site included
arsenic, chloride, fluoride, lead, nitrate/nitrite, radium-226 and sulfate.43
Two potentially responsible parties, Conoco, Inc. and Freeport
McMoRan, Inc., entered into a consent decree with the EPA in 1989.44
Per the consent decree, the two companies were legally and financially
responsible for the cleanup and remediation of the Agrico property.
The site of the former Escambia Wood Treating Company (ETC) is
located just 1,000 feet away from the Agrico Chemical site. Starting in
1944, yellow pine logs were shipped to ETC, where they were de-
barked, formed, dried, pressure impregnated with preservative, and
38 CARL J. MOHRHERR ET AL., UNIV. OF WEST FLORIDA, PROFILES OF SELECTED
POLLUTANTS in BAYOU TEXAR, PENSACOLA, FLORIDA (2005), available at http://uwf.
edu/cedb/PERCH_Bayou_Texar_final_report.pdf.
39 Id. at 11.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See Part II infra for a discussion of the National Priorities List as a component
of CERCLA’s regulatory scheme.
43 Agrico Chemical Company, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
region4/superfund/sites/npl/florida/agricchemfl.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
44 Consent Decree for Settling Defendants, United States v. Agrico (N.D. Fla.
1989) (No. 93-23-C) available at http://www.epa.gov/region4/foiapgs/readingroom/
admin_order_on_consent/agrico_chemical_6.pdf; see also Mohrherr, supra note 37, at
11.
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stored before being shipped45 for use as utility poles, foundation piling
and lumber.46 From 1944 – 1970, coal-tar creosote was used to treat the
wood to make it resistant to insects and weather. In 1963, the company
started experimenting with a new wood preservative called pentachloro-
phenol (PCP), a strong biocide that kills fungi, insects and marine
organisms that can destroy untreated wood.47 PCP is often contaminated
with dioxin which is one of the most highly toxic chemicals in the
world. 48
From the 1940s to the mid-1950s, contaminated wastewater from
the plant was sent to an unlined earthen impoundment area- a hole in the
ground.49 After the mid-1950s, ETC installed a system to recapture
some of the preservatives that were being poured into the ground. That
process culminated in the water being flushed into the county sewer sys-
tem and exposed the community to more toxic fumes and overtaxed the
sewage treatment plants. This process continued for approximately forty
years until the EPA commenced inspections and began to cite ETC for
violations in 1985.50
Environmental justice activist and community leader Margaret
Williams was raised at 27 Pearl Street, Pensacola, Florida, in a house
that was situated between ETC and Agrico. Williams recalled:
“Pollution from the plants coated everything. …The screens on the
windows of her childhood home were caked in yellow sulfur released
from the fertilizer plant and water from local wells was oily. On some
days, while walking to school, Williams had to shield her eyes with her
hands and cover her nose and mouth with a kerchief against the dust and
odors. Worst of all, her house was like an oven in the summer because
her parents closed the windows to keep out the strong chemical
fumes.”51
Williams also remembered flooding from ETC being a problem.
The treatment site did not install drainage pipes to divert storm water
run-off from carrying pollution from the facility downhill into neighbor-
hood yards and houses.52
45 Lerner, supra note 32.
46 Mohrherr, supra note 37, at 12; Lerner, supra note 32, at 1.
47 Lerner, supra note 32, at 1.
48 Id. at 2.
49 Lerner, supra note 32, at 1.
50 Id. at 2.
51 Lerner, supra note 32, at 1.
52 Id.
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Over the years, waste water from the facility seeped into the
groundwater contaminating the shallow wells that many residents de-
pended on for water. They recall having to pump the water for several
minutes to clear the oily substance and get relatively clean drinking wa-
ter.53 According to Williams, “No one told us at the time that the reason
they capped the wells was that the groundwater was contaminated…We
just thought they were improving the system.”54 Indeed, it strains
credulity to believe that it was mere coincidence that in 1982, the
owners of ETC sold the plant to their workers without disclosing the
environmental liabilities.55 Then the company went bankrupt, which left
the financial responsibility for cleanup to the tax-payers.56
ETC was abandoned with “leaking and unlabeled drums, a lab full
of broken equipment and opened containers, an overturned electrical
transformer, crumbling asbestos insulation around a boiler- as well as
soil, sludge, and groundwater contamination from the waste pits.”57 The
level of contaminants found on site was shocking. In some areas, the soil
was tested as contaminated with as much as 1.09 ppm of dioxin, which
is 545,000 times the acceptable residential limit.58 In addition to the di-
oxin, there were high levels of creosote, pentachlorophenol, furans,
naphthalene, PCBs, asbestos, benzene, toluene, xylene, chromium, and
dieldrin.59
In 1991, nine years after ETC had been abandoned, EPA inspectors
found elevated levels of PCPs at up to fourteen feet into the subsoil of
the site.60 Within a month, the EPA began excavating the contaminated
soil. By January 1993, 255,000 cubic yards of soil had been piled up.61
The excavation continued throughout 1992. The toxic soil was piled into
a mound that was sixty feet tall, 1,000 feet long and 30 to 40 feet wide.
The EPA made some attempts to incinerate the soil onsite but could not
53 Id.
54 Id. at 1.
55 See id. at 3.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 See id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 4.
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afford to continue the process. Unable to treat this large volume of con-
taminated soil onsite, EPA officials decided to cover it with a sixty
millimeter plastic liner. The residents were initially told that the liner
would last for five years.
Later, they were told that the liner would effectively contain the
contaminated soil for ten years.62 That tarp was allowed to remain in
place for over fifteen years. During this time, large holes and tears were
discovered in the tarp. Indeed, some residents reported seeing small
trees growing through the holes in the plastic. Additionally, the plastic
covered mountain was an attractive nuisance which provided a gigantic
slide for the neighborhood children. The tarp continued to “cover” the
contamination through the severe Florida sun, hurricanes, and down-
pours. Finally, in 1998, when the United States Army Corps of Engi-
neers (USACE) attempted repairs of the tarp, it was concluded that the
plastic was wearing out and had become obsolete.63
One morning, as the community went about its normal daily affairs,
people looked out of their windows to find “men in moon-suits.” At that
point, the plant had been abandoned for years and they had no idea that
the “Big Dig” was about to begin. State officials were also unaware of
the EPA’s unannounced excavation. Ed Middleswart, a former district
air program administrator for the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection, recalls being caught off-guard when he began to receive
“blitzes of calls, about people moving around in moon suits, earth mov-
ing equipment and creating a lot of dust and odor problems in this little
neighborhood.”64
The EPA workers conducted their excavation in full protective gear
while only fifteen yards away, whereas children played in their yards
with no protection.65 During the EPA’s initial cleanup efforts, little if
any effort was made to notify the community of the severity of the
health risks associated with the contamination and cleanup. Throughout
the excavation process, residents in the surrounding communities began
to experience a significant increase in headaches, nausea, dizziness,
breathing problems, nosebleeds, and other acute health problems.66
62 Id. at 5.
63 Lerner, supra note 32.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
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Dunham was “outraged and horrified that [her] government would treat
people this way.”67
Finally, on October 3, 1996, the EPA agreed to move all 358
households from the site at an estimated cost of $18 million. This relo-
cation was the first time that an African American community had been
relocated under EPA’s Superfund program. It was hailed as a landmark
victory for environmental justice. As of June 2007, building demolition,
chemical disposal, and site fencing was completed. The total cost was
$25 million.68
2. The Struggle Continues: Tallevast, Florida
“Why didn’t anyone tell us?”69
“I’m afraid Lockheed Martin will admit its mistake too late. They
are just going to let us die.”70
Tallevast, Florida is a historic African American community locat-
ed on the west coast of the state, approximately 45 minutes south of
Tampa. This small working class community started as a turpentine
camp. At the turn of the 19th century, Tallevast was covered by longleaf-
slash pines. Men slashed the 100 foot pine trees to extract the resin that
would be boiled and distilled so as to produce turpentine. The turpentine
would then be loaded into barrels and shipped north on the Seminole-
Gulf railroad line, which was extended into Tallevast to facilitate the
lucrative export. The “turp camp” in Tallevast attracted laborers from
Georgia and the Carolinas.71 Thousands migrated to the small town
where they built small homes and established themselves while working
for the founder of the community, J.H. Tallevast.72 Other residents
67 Lerner, supra note 32, at 8.
68 Capek, supra note 7.
69 See Lerner, supra note 32, at 7 (quoting Cassandra “Casey” Brice).
70 See Lerner, supra note 32, at 9 (quoting Brenda Pinkney).
71 Id.
72 Ronnie Greene, Taking the Law Into Their Own Hands: Fence Line Fighting
and Environmental Justice from a Journalist’s Point of View, 2 EARTH JURISPRUDENCE
& ENVTL. JUST. J. 60, 73 (2012).
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worked in the Florida orange groves, on dairy farms, and for Ringling
Brothers Circus, which is headquartered nearby in Sarasota, Florida.73
In 1948, the Visioneering Company opened an engineering plant on
Tallevast Road.74 Operations at the Visioneering plant generated chemi-
cals and chemical wastes which included oils, petroleum based fuels,
solvents, acids and metals.75 In 1958, the factory was renamed American
Beryllium Company and moved just a few blocks up the road to 1600
Tallevast Road. The Loral Metal Company purchased ABC in 1961 and
operated under contract with the U.S. Department of Energy and the
U.S. Department of Defense to meet the demand for weapons caused by
the accelerating Cold War arms race.76 At this point the company was
called Loral American Beryllium (LAB). LAB manufactured parts for
nuclear weapons, atomic reactors, and space program projects. Morris
Robinson, who worked as a janitor at ABC recalls cleaning out tanks
that held a colorless solution. In an interview with journalist Ronnie
Green, Robinson explained, “I had to hold my breath.…And I would
have to step out of the room, get fresh air, hold it, and go back in and
finish up.”77
After the plant closed in 1996, Lockheed Martin bought the
property as part of a $9.1 billion purchase of many of the assets of Loral
Corporation.78 Lockheed Martin did not conduct an environmental
assessment until a year later when it was planning to sell the site.79 By
January 2000, the company discovered leaks of various toxic chemicals
of concern when Lockheed Martin employees discovered that a sump
pump in one of the buildings had broken and spilled large quantities of
industrial solvents and cancer-causing chemicals into the soil and
groundwater.80 Among those chemicals of concern that contaminated the
groundwater in levels that exceeded the Florida Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection’s (FDEP) guidelines were beryllium, chromium,
tetrachloroethylene (TCE), and 1,1-dichloroethylene. The soil samples
73 Lerner, supra note 32, at 7.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 See id.
77 Id.
78 See Lerner, supra note 32, at 8.
79 Lerner, supra note 32, at 1.
80 Id.
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contained excessive levels of volatile organic compounds (VOCs), total
petroleum hydrocarbons and other harmful compounds and metals.81
As the owner of the property when the leak was discovered, Lock-
heed Martin was liable for the cleanup process. At some point,
Lockheed Martin entered into a consent order with the FDEP, which
compels Lockheed Martin to remediate the site and gives the FDEP
broad discretion in its oversight of the remediation.82 For three years
following the discovery of the contamination in 2000, Lockheed Martin
conducted a quiet, voluntary clean-up of some of the onsite contamina-
tion.83 They hired Tetra Tech, a California-based company, to remove
538 tons of contaminated soils. During its soil samplings, Tetra Tech
found trichloroethylene, tetrachloroethylene, dichloroethylene, and vinyl
chloride.84 Lockheed disclosed its findings with the state of Florida and
with Manatee County, informing them that the contaminants were mi-
grating offsite in the groundwater. However, Lockheed Martin stopped
short of notifying the residents who lived on the land surrounding the
property, many of whom had depended on wells that drew from the
groundwater in which the numerous toxins had been found for drinking
and bathing.85
Similarly, FDEP and Manatee County also failed to notify the sur-
rounding community of the groundwater contamination in their commu-
nity.86 When an FDEP spokeswoman was asked why the state did not
inform the residents, she responded “I don’t believe we had a re-
gulation.”87 Interestingly, residents learned that a county official had
been dispatched to determine if any residents in the community were
using their own wells. However, per county records, the official failed to
81 Id.
82 Donna Wright, Patience Wearing Thin in Tallevast, BRANDENTON HERALD
(May 20, 2005), available at http://earthhopenetwork.net/patience_wearing_thin_
tallevast.htm; see also Florida Fines Lockheed Martin $50,000 for Tainted Water
Discharge, ENVIRONMENT NEWS SERVICE (Oct. 13, 2008), http://ens-newswire.
com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/2008-10-13-094.html.
83 SeeWright, supra note 82.
84 Id.
85 See id.
86 Lerner, supra note 32, at 8.
87 Greene, supra note 72, at 73.
128 EARTH JURISPRUDENCE AND [Vol. 4
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE JOURNAL
get out of her car to complete her assigned task because she was afraid
of dogs.88
One afternoon in September 2003, Tallevast resident Laura Ward
looked out her window to find a rig drilling on her land. When she in-
quired as to their business on her property the worker told her, “You
don’t know, but the water is contaminated here. We’re putting in moni-
toring wells in your community because the water is contaminated.”89
When Ward heard this, she “felt the world shift beneath her feet.”90
Expressing her anger, Ward stated, “I made baby formula and cooked
for my family with that water for years while people at Lockheed Martin
and at the county regulatory agencies knew how harmful it was.”91 A
few weeks later, a Lockheed Martin executive told Ward, “There’s some
TCE in the water. We don’t think it’s very far off site.”92 However, the
executive was horribly mistaken. In July 2003, the FDEP approved
Lockheed Martin’s Contamination Assessment Report, which indicated
that “most” of the contamination was limited to the five-acre property at
1600 Tallevast Road, with a small plume extending northeast of the
facility.93 However, a chronology of events compiled by Donna Wright,
a Bradenton Herald reporter and Wilma Subra, a renowned chemist,
proved the Report to be inaccurate.94
According to the timeline that Wright and Subra constructed,
Lockheed Martin informed state regulators by 2003 that the plume of
toxins had crossed over into the residential community and they had
been required to develop a cleanup plan. By May 2003, a report pro-
duced by Tetra Tech, the company that Lockheed Martin had hired to
perform the assessments, confirmed that the toxic plume had migrated to
at least 12 acres off site.95 This information was further confirmed in
April 2004 when water samples from five out of 17 wells located out-
side of the established plume boundaries were found to have elevated
88 Lerner, supra note 32, at 2.
89 Id.
90 Steve Lerner, Chemical Contamination In Fenceline Communities: Tallevast,
Florida: Rural Residents Live Atop Groundwater Contaminated by High-Tech Weapons
Company, THE COLLABORATIVE ON HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2008) available
at http://www.healthandenvironment.org/articles/homepage.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Lerner supra note 90, at 5.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 6.
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solvent levels.96 The documented size of the plume continued to grow
from “not very far off site” to over 200 acres off site.97 In one spot, the
TCE concentration was 10,000 times above state standards. In another
spot, the state located TCE where Lockheed Martin had not.98
In June 2004, Subra reported that a sampling, paid for by the resi-
dents, revealed that two homes in the area had 116 times the level of
TCE considered to be safe. Testing samples from the site revealed that
the solvent trichloroethylene was present at 10,000 times the drinking
water standard. In August 21, 2004, Lockheed Martin released a report
that showed TCE levels in water beneath the plant at nearly 12,000
times the state standard and in nearby wells at up to 500 times the
code.99
In July 2004, the FDEP released the Tallevast Community Prelimi-
nary Assessment Contamination Report (Report).100 The Report
concluded that the toxic solvents had impacted both the surficial aquifer
and the underlying intermediate aquifer system in Tallevast. The plume
in the surficial aquifer was found to have carried the solvent north,
northeast, south and southeast of the point of origin under the ABC
plant. The report called for further investigations detailing the contami-
nation in the intermediate aquifer system.101 Analyses of 129 soil
samples collected from the Tallevast community indicate the presence
of arsenic, barium, lead, benzo(a)pyrene, benzo(b)fluoranthene, diben-
zo(a,h)anthracene, and Total Recoverable Petroleum Hydrocarbons
(TRPH) exceeding their respective FDEP Soil Cleanup Target Levels
(SCTL) in some of the samples collected. The source of these contami-
nants is indeterminate. Soil samples were primarily collected from loca-
tions where fill dirt from the former American Beryllium Company had
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See id.
99 Id.
100 ROBERT CILEK, P.G., ET. AL., FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., SIS REPORT NO.
2004-01, TALLEVAST COMMUNITY TALLEVAST, MANATEE COUNTY FLORIDA PRE-
LIMINARY CONTAMINATION ASSESSMENT REPORT (July 2004), available at
http://www.dep.state.fl.us/waste/quick_topics/publications/wc/Tallevast/TallevastCom
munity.pdf.
101 Id. at 15.
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reportedly been utilized; of these locations, only two residences were
within the SCTL.102
Even though Lockheed Martin conceded that the chemicals had
spread into the groundwater in the surrounding area, the company con-
tinued to deny that there was any threat to the health of local residents
and firmly proclaimed its ongoing commitment to “doing the right
thing” for the residents of Tallevast. However, Subra, who has won the
McArthur “genius” award for her work in contaminated communities,
explained that people should not be living atop a toxic groundwater
plume. Subra warned, “You have to get them out of there.”103
There are various possible exposure pathways by which the
Tallevast residents were contaminated by the toxins from the Lockheed
Martin site. The contaminated groundwater flowed from the aquifer and
out through the faucets of the residents’ homes. People drank the water,
and cooked and bathed with it. Children played in the water from garden
hoses, while adults water their lawns and washed their vehicles. Another
possible route of exposure is through the inhalation of toxic gases that
may have been released when the faucets, showers, and water hoses
were in use. Additionally, residents were exposed to toxins by contact
with the dirt from the Lockheed Martin site. Beverly Bradley remembers
having three truckloads of dirt from the site, which is across the street
from her home, being spread in her backyard. Bradley has been an avid
gardener for most of her life and now has dark lesions on her hands,
arms, and feet.104
Another possible route of exposure comes from the fish that were
taken from the plant’s pond. A former janitor at the plant reported that
when a machinist would make a mistake working on a piece of berylli-
um, he would ask the janitor to throw it into the pond so that the fore-
man would not discover the mistake. Plant officials would periodically
stock the pond with trout so that the workers and their families could
participate in “Fishathons” to catch fish to take home for consump-
tion.105
Perhaps the most obvious link between the toxins from the plant
and the illness in the community is the presence of the rare lung disease
berylliosis. The dust from beryllium, a heavy metal, is toxic and can
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Lerner, supra note 32, at 8.
105 Id. at 9.
2014]A TALE OF TWO CITIES: THE NEED FOR GREATER
FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT TO ENSURE PROPER NOTIFICATION,
MEDICAL MONITORING AND TREATMENT, AND SUCCESSFUL
RELOCATION FOR TALLEVAST, FLORIDA AND OTHER
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE COMMUNITIES 131
cause problems with the respiratory, organ, and central nervous sys-
tems.106 Berylliosis has been the subject of considerable litigation, in-
cluding class action suits by former beryllium workers.107 Wilma Subra
described the dust residue at the plant as “one of the worst” she had ever
seen.108 The majority of the Tallevast residents who were hired to work
at the plant were hired for janitorial and maintenance jobs, which in-
volved milling large chunks of beryllium and cleaning the beryllium
dust out of the vents and the attic. Many other former ABC plant em-
ployees have berylliosis, cancer, and/or need oxygen to help them
breathe. Others are reported to have slurred speech and impaired motor
abilities. Many of them have already passed away, such as one gentle-
man, Ernest Smith, who died of throat cancer at the age of 29.109
Just prior to the discovery of the toxic plume, Tallevast residents
Laura Ward and Wanda Washington had started a community-based
organization to draw low income housing developments to their com-
munity. However, after the news of the toxins was made public, those
plans quickly faded. The organization instead became Family Oriented
Community United and Strong (FOCUS), which was dedicated to lead-
ing the fight for their community to be made whole. In January 2005,
Tallevast residents demanded that Manatee county officials relocate
them and buyout their properties. Six months later, county com-
missioners demanded that Lockheed Martin relocate the residents so as
to protect their health and to remove them from exposure to the
contamination. However, when the county lawyers began to fear that the
county may be sued, the commissioners ceased activity.110
In 2011, Tallevast was one of three Florida communities cited in a
report by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC).111 The
NRDC, along with well-known activist Erin Brokovitch, presented the
report on “disease clusters” to the Senate. The state of Florida, which
has known about the problems in Tallevast for over a decade, finally
106 Lerner, supra note 32, at 8.
107 Id.
108 Lerner, supra note32, at 9.
109 Id. at 9.
110 See Lerner, supra note 32, at 10.
111 The other cities were Immokalee and Acreage.
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sent a doctor to Tallevast to conduct a health study. Dr. Javier Gansana,
a specialist in environmental and occupational medicine, conducted in-
terviews of over 130 Tallevast residents. On October 9, 2012, Dr.
Gansana stated that he would deliver the report to Wanda Washington in
Tallevast.112 It does not appear that the report has been published or
otherwise made available to the public at this time. However, the infor-
mation contained therein is sure to prove invaluable for the people of
Tallevast.
The concentration of the chemicals found in the small community
is staggering. Some well water in Tallevast was found to contain 250 to
500 parts per billion (ppb) of TCE, a known carcinogen for which the
regulatory standard in three ppb. It seems almost common sense to con-
nect the presence of poisons in the community and the decades of
exposure and consumption to the devastating number of illnesses in
Tallevast. Ms. Washington serves as an example of the ways that poi-
sons devastate lives in environmental justice communities. Her mother
has breast cancer, diabetes, skin growths, and a bad cough. Washington,
who is “angry as hell” about the contamination in the community as well
as the treatment of the residents, “had a child who died at seven months,
one who was retarded, and one who survived.”113 Washington’s sister,
Robin, suffered from a stroke while in her thirties. She suffers from mi-
graines and seizures and gave birth to an underweight infant. Her uncle,
who worked at ABC, is currently being treated for berylliosis.114
Tallevast resident Helen E. Beyers Worthington, an Air Force vet-
eran who worked as a registered nurse at various military bases around
the world, conducted a health study of her community. Worthington was
skeptical at first, thinking that she “would likely not find any problem.”
However, she quickly found that something was horribly wrong in the
community. Upon visiting another family, Worthington found that four
of seven brothers had died of various cancers, including cancer of the
throat. Next door, she found three men with liver cancer, and their sons
also had liver problems.
In another household, eight of the ten children in the family had
died at young ages of leukemia, brain, lung and uterine cancer.
112 E-mail from Dr. Janvier Gansana, MD, MPH, PhD, Associate Professor,
Environmental and Occupational Health, Florida International University (Oct. 9,
2012).
113 Lerner, supra note 32, at 3.
114 Lerner, supra note 32, at 3.
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Worthington counted that out of 87 households, fifteen members were
currently living with cancer. She did not include those residents who are
known to have cancer, but have not openly disclosed their illnesses.115
Worthington also noted a suspiciously high occurrence of miscarriages,
sterility, low birth rates, neurological disorders, and retardation. She
noted that “almost every house in town has people with health prob-
lems.”116
Another Tallevast resident, retired postal worker Beverly Bradley,
lives across the street from the plant and has had four miscarriages. One
child was stillborn, one lived for a few hours, and only one survived.
Bradley, who also has dark lesions on her arms, hands and feet, which
are likely from her contact with poisonous soil while gardening, remem-
bers playing in the drainage ditches that came from the plant.
“I’m angry. My family worked hard to own property to give me
and I want to give it to my son but now, because of the contamination,
we can’t even get a loan to fix up the house or build a new one. We are
stuck in a bad situation with no solution. An injustice has been done and
someone should pay.”117
While Lockheed Martin had already agreed to perform the cleanup
of the contaminated community, and was legally bound by its consent
decree with the state of Florida, the company refused to honor the resi-
dents’ pleas for relocation. Reportedly, Lockheed Martin claimed that
the contamination poses no risks to the residents’ health.118 Lockheed
Martin has also claimed that relocation efforts would undermine their
commitment to remove all contamination from the community.119 The
company has created a medical program that provides free examina-
tions, for residents of Tallevast. Also, Lockheed Martin claims to have
implemented a property value guarantee program for the residents.
Under this program, gap payments are provided to residents and
115 Id. at 4-5.
116 Id. at 5.
117 Lerner, supra note 32 at 8.
118 Florida Fines Lockheed Martin $50,000 for Tainted Water Discharge, ENV’T
NEWS SERVICE (Oct. 13, 2008), http://ens-newswire.com/wp-content/uploads/
2010/05/2008-10-13-094.html.
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property owners who wish to sell their property but are unable to secure
full market value due to the groundwater contamination in the area. 120
Lockheed Martin officials have vigorously denied that there is any
reason to relocate the community because residents were not at risk.
Furthermore, the company argues that cleanup efforts should be con-
fined to the plant property because the soil and water samples show that
the plume poses no threat to health and does not require remedial
measures. Four lawsuits have been filed against Lockheed Martin by the
residents of Tallevast including a class action, which 270 Tallevast resi-
dents have joined.121 The class action suit was filed on September 1,
2005 and sought damaged for loss of property value and emotional dis-
tress. A settlement was reached rather quickly in August of 2010. The
terms of the suit were confidential and the parties are not allowed to
discuss the terms. However, some information has leaked regarding the
settlement. While the accuracy of the information cannot be confirmed,
the information seems reasonable. It is claimed that the settlement was
in the amount of $12 million. Reportedly, $5.6 million went to the
lawyers. The other funds were divided among the property owners.
II. An Understanding of CERCLA
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA), enacted in 1980, is the primary federal statute
governing the remediation of spills or releases of hazardous
substances.122 CERCLA is often called “Superfund”. However, the
“Superfund” is only one part of CERCLA. Superfund is the trust fund
that was established to provide financing for cleanups in some circum-
stances. However, equally important is the ability of CERCLA to com-
pel responsible parties to contribute to the cleanup of contaminated
sites.123 Also, under CERCLA, environmental authorities can undertake
a cleanup of contaminated sites and seek reimbursement from
potentially responsible parties (PRPs) or compel PRPs to clean up
120 See id.
121 Timothy R. Wolfrum, Tallevast Residents, Lockheed Martin Settle Suit,
BRADENTON.COM (Sept. 4, 2010), available at http://www.bradenton.com/2010/
09/04/2552125/tallevast-residents-lockheed-martin.html.
122 CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN, ETAL., ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY &
REGULATION 285(Carolina Academic Press 2d ed. 2009).
123 Id.
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sites.124 It is imperative that community groups be aware of the
processes involved in CERCLA cleanups so as to ensure their participa-
tion in the development and selection of cleanup.
CERCLA imposes strict liability on four categories of PRPs for the
cleanup of releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances:: (1)
the present or former owners of facilities or vessels where the release or
threatened release occurs; (2) present and former operators of a facility
or vessel; (3) persons who arranged for the disposal, treatment, or trans-
portation of hazardous substances; and (4) persons who accepted haz-
ardous substances for transportation to a waste disposal site.125 In order
to establish liability under CERCLA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
there has been “a release or threatened release of hazardous substances
from a facility that caused the incurrence of response costs and the de-
fendant falls within one of the categories of PRPs identified by the
statute.”126
Once a site has been identified, the EPA conducts a preliminary
assessment and places data into the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Information System (CERCLIS),
a database of all hazardous release sites.127 CERCLIS then takes into
consideration various factors related to the site, such as the toxicity,
quantity and concentration of wastes present at the site, and then gives
the site a score under the Hazardous Ranking System (HRS). The higher
ranking sites are placed on the National Priorities List (NPL).128 The
order in which the sites are cleaned up depends upon factors such as the
size of the population at risk, potential for contamination of water sup-
plies, potential for public contact, and the possibility that damage to
natural resources might affect the human food chain.129 Some research
suggests that agencies routinely choose less protective cleanups for poor
124 See Larry Schnapf, Cleaning Up Abandoned or Inactive Contaminated Sites, in
THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS
DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 522 (Michael B. Gerrard, ed., 1999).
125 Id. at 523.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 527.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 529.
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and minority communities and notes that such sites generally take longer
to achieve NPL listing.130
In 2005, the Superfund turned twenty-five. In a report published by
the Center for American Progress and the Center for Progressive Re-
form, Professor Rena Steinzor and Margaret Clune concluded that
cleanups were lagging because the provisions for funding had been al-
lowed to lapse.131 The program lost its “polluter-pays” funding base in
1995. According to the report, “A series of Republican–controlled
Congresses allowed the industry taxes that support the program to expire
and ignored yearly requests by the Clinton administration to reinstate
them… .”132 In 2001, the number of Superfund cleanups fell abruptly to
50 percent of previous annual totals.133 In the 2003, 2004, and 2005,
only 40 cleanups were completed.134
III. Proposal for Tallevast, Florida and Similarly Situated
Environmental Justice Communities
The combination of local and state governments with large corpora-
tions makes for “odd bedfellows.” The desire and ability of individual
states to regulate and remediate may be frustrated by a number of factors
that influence state and local officials. First, as is perhaps best mani-
fested in the EPA’s Region IV, continuing legacies of racism and
disregard for the health and safety of poor and minority communities
presents an elusive and insidious enemy with which environmental jus-
tice communities must contend. Additionally, local and state authorities
are often engaged in a “race to the bottom,” in which states are forced to
lower their standards to retain and attract industry.135
Congress has relied on the “race to the bottom” as a rationale for
federal action. A House Report on the 1977 amendments to the Clean
Water Act warned that “if there was no Federal policy, States may find
themselves forced into a bidding war to attract new industry by reducing
130 RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 122, at 285.
131 Id. at 284.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 45 (West, 6th Edition 2004).
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pollution standards.”136 While it is understandable that authorities must
make reasonable, even zealous efforts to generate revenue for the state
and its residents, it is not acceptable to do so in a manner that makes
human life expendable while devastating the environment. Un-
fortunately, this insidious treatment and conscious disregard usually
falls on poor and minority communities who do not have the resources
to combat the juggernaut that results from the marriage of government
and industry.
Multinational Corporation Lockheed Martin has operated in the
Central Florida community for over forty years. A brief review of Lock-
heed Martin’s relationship with the environment demonstrates its history
of disregard and destruction throughout the United States.137 In 1996,
Lockheed Martin began the process of cleaning up its Central Florida
site, which included several landfills that were used by the company to
dispose of heavy metals and other hazardous materials. In 1998,
Universal Studios purchased 2,000 acres of the site with plans to rede-
velop the land into a $10 billion resort and office complex.138Lockheed
Martin is the ninth largest employer in Central Florida and brings mil-
lions of dollars of revenue and incentives annually.139 The FDEP’s
deferential posture in dealing with Lockheed Martin’s treatment of the
Tallevast community likely reflects its desire to placate the company so
as to continue the lucrative relationship that exists between the two. So
then, how do environmental justice communities, who are overwhelm-
ingly comprised of low-income households, combat this omnipresent
“race to the bottom” and overcome being seen as externalities? The
136 Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collection Actions Perspective on
Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate
Change, 102 NW. U.L. REV. 579 (2008).
137 Federal Contractor Misconduct Database, PROJECTONGOVERNMENTAL
OVERSIGHT (POGO.ORG), http://www.contractormisconduct.org/index.cfm/1,73,221,
html?ContractorID=38&ranking=1 (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
138 More Protection, Less Process: Common-Sense Environmental Management,
DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., http://www.dep.state.fl.us/secretary/info/pubs/brochure.pdf
(last visited April 27, 2014).
139 Central Florida Top 100 Companies for 2011, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Nov. 20,
2011), available at http://www.orlandosentinel.com/orl-cfb-top-100-companies-2011,
0,4290703.htmlstory.
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solution must come from the federal government as opposed to the state
DEPs.
A. Overfiling as a Remedy for the Problems Facing Environmental
Justice Communities
It is necessary to find novel methods of regulation and enforcement
to ensure that environmental justice communities receive swift, effective
and just treatment. This article proposes that the USEPA should use the
method of “overfiling” as a tool to ensure that the federal government
maintains oversight of cleanup processes.
Overfiling occurs when the federal government brings an environ-
mental enforcement suit in situations where the state environmental
enforcement agency has not sufficiently prosecuted a violator of a
federal environmental statute.140 Overfiling fits squarely into the “coop-
erative federalism” model that characterizes the United States’ environ-
mental laws. The term “cooperative federalism” refers to the interplay of
power between the federal and state sovereigns.141 While Congress has
granted initial enforcement and regulatory power to the EPA, once a
state can demonstrate that it is capable of enforcing the statutory man-
dates that EPA has established, then the EPA may then delegate a
portion of its regulatory and enforcement powers to the states.142
In the event that the EPA disagrees with the state’s handling of an
environmental issue, the federal government may then “overfile” against
the organization or individual that is responsible for the contamination
and/or cleanup. The federal government may bring suit even if the state
has already brought an enforcement action or had negotiated a settle-
ment.143 The states are often resentful of this type of policy and the “co-
operative” relationship is often adversarial. State officials “resent what
they believe to be an overly prescriptive federal orientation toward state
programs, especially in light of stable or decreasing grant
awards.”144Additionally, the states have the ability to “underfile” by
140 Alex P. Abrams, Note, Why “Underfiling” By States Can and Should Be Used
to Enforce Environmental Regulations, 31 B.C. Evtl. Aff. L. Rev. 403, 403 (2004).
141 See id.
142 Id at 404.
143 Abrams, supra note 140, at 403.
144 Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and The Future of Federal
Environmental Regulation, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 377, 385 (2005).
2014]A TALE OF TWO CITIES: THE NEED FOR GREATER
FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT TO ENSURE PROPER NOTIFICATION,
MEDICAL MONITORING AND TREATMENT, AND SUCCESSFUL
RELOCATION FOR TALLEVAST, FLORIDA AND OTHER
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE COMMUNITIES 139
bringing a suit against the EPA, challenging its treatment of the situa-
tion.145
The case of United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., demonstrates
the complexities of the overfiling process.146 In 1997, the EPA brought
action in federal district court against a Virginia pork processing com-
pany, Smithfield Foods, Inc., that had violated its permit by discharging
pollutants into a local river at levels which exceeded the limits imposed
by its permit.147 After the EPA brought suit, the State of Virginia insti-
tuted an action in state court against Smithfield on the basis of permit
violations, the State of Virginia, however, alleged different violations
than did the EPA.148 The state action proceeded concurrently with the
federal action. The EPA prevailed in its suit with the district court
granted summary judgment on the issue of liability and fined the com-
pany $12.6 million in July 1997.149 Also in July, the state court issued a
decree that allowed Smithfield to make changes that would satisfy the
requirements of its permits. After making these changes, Smithfield
filed a motion to dismiss or alternatively, for summary judgment in the
federal case. However, the district court denied Smithfield’s request for
reversal. That decision was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit.150
Ideally states should not have oversight in regards to environmental
justice communities. The EPA should maintain and assert its status of
primary enforcer of environmental regulation when an environmental
justice community files complaints and/or brings suit. Using the process
of overfiling would mean that the states’ Departments of Environmental
Protection would have to be given a standard period of time in which it
must assess the damage and the necessary cleanup and remediation pro-
cedures, locate the potentially responsible parties (PRPs), enter into
consent decrees with the PRPs, and monitor the cleanup activities. If the
state’s actions do not meet the standards that the EPA has established,
then the state should be subject to sanction. The EPA should levy the
145 Abrams, supra note 140, at 403.
146 United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769 (1997).
147 Id.
148 State Water Control Bd. v. Smithfield Foods, 542 S.E.2d 766 (2001).
149 See Smithfield supra note 146.
150 Id.
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sanctions against the state and overfile against the PRPs and the state to
ensure that the cleanup and remediation process continues at a reasona-
ble pace. It is imperative for the EPA to remember that time is of the
essence. The litigation should not allow for long gaps in cleanup and
remediation.
In order to procure funding for the litigation and oversight,
Congress should restore the industry “polluter pays” taxes that were
allowed to expire in 1995. Many of the problems and frustrations with
the Superfund program have resulted from the expiration of that
funding. How can the Superfund operate effectively without funds? The
revenue generated from the taxes will also allow the EPA to conduct the
cleanups that it must due to the absence and/or inability of the
potentially responsible parties, thereby decreasing the number of active
Superfund sites, some of which have been listed for decades. However,
the use of the overfiling method, if administered properly should not
impose an undue burden on the Superfund. The potentially responsible
parties should be compelled to fund the cleanup and remediation pro-
cesses.
B. Specific Suggestions for Tallevast, Florida
With respect to specific lessons to be learned from the experience
of the Escambia County community, this article focuses on the im-
portance of adequate notification, medical monitoring and treatment,
and successful relocation as defined by the community.
1. Proper Notification
The residents of both Escambia County and Tallevast were failed
with respect to notification about the toxins in their communities and
their exposure to those contaminants. In Escambia County, the EPA was
aware of the contamination at the ETC and Agrico sites. It was not until
the “men in moonsuits” appeared in the community and started excavat-
ing poisonous soil which released additional contaminants into the air
that the residents were made aware of the problem. That appearance and
emergency cleanup does not suffice as “notice,” however. Likewise,
after “men in moonsuits” showed up on Tallevast resident Ward’s lawn
and began installing a monitoring well, the residents were not made
aware of the contamination. Lockheed Martin, Manatee County and the
State of Florida kept the contamination a secret for three years.
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Moreover, official notification of contamination did not come until five
years after Lockheed Martin had notified the county and state officials.
This is unacceptable and should not happen again.
The residents of Tallevast actually procured a great victory in
pressing for and achieving the passing of the “Tallevast Bill,” Florida
Statute 376.30702 “Contamination Notification”.151 The Tallevast Bill
gives specific time frames for notification of the finding of contamina-
tion to the FDEP and to the residents in the area of the contaminated
site. Those who own or rent property near the contaminated site must be
notified by the DEP within 30 days of the DEP having received notifica-
tion.
It is unclear, however, what consequences exist if the stipulations
of the Tallevast Bill are disregarded. There should be specified ramifica-
tions for those who discover the contamination, as well as for the state
offices or officials, who do not comply with the Tallevast Bill. Failure to
comply should trigger an automatic sanction from the EPA and should
trigger the commencement of an overfiling action against the
perpetrator.
2. The Importance of Properly Administered Medical
Monitoring and Treatment Programs
Environmental Justice Communities are wrought with illness and
lack of information regarding the poisons surrounding them and the
effects of those contaminants on the health of the community. Therefore,
it is necessary to provide community members, not only with medical
monitoring and screening, but also with medical treatment. There is no
written or unwritten rule that medical monitoring provisions include
coverage for the treatment of the illnesses that may be diagnosed as
having arisen from exposure. An interview with Francine Ishmael, the
current Executive Director of CATE, the community organization in
Escambia County, exposed numerous dangers associated with medical
monitoring programs that are not controlled by the community or by
federal oversight.
151 Fla. Stat. § 376.30702 (2005).
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In Escambia County, residents were awarded two million dollars
from Conoco-Phillips, the potentially responsible party for the Agrico
site, for medical monitoring. CATE wanted to deposit the money in an
interest-bearing account while using part of the funds to pay for medical
screening and transportation for those who were unable to get to the
doctors’ offices. However, Conoco-Philips never released the funds.
When CATE brought suit to compel payment, the court found for
Conono-Philips and returned the money to the company.152 This loss
was a “slap in the face” to the CATE activists, and especially to
Ishmael’s late mother, Margaret Williams, the founder of CATE. How-
ever, the significance of this loss was more than just the insult that it
added to the injuries in the community. The people of the community
were suffering from abnormal levels of cancer and other illnesses. Many
people had no way to get to the doctor and no means to pay for any
medical attention. The loss of those funds ended any hopes of receiving
medical attention.
As applied to the Tallevast residents, the type of travesty that
snatched the meager medical monitoring funds away from the Escambia
County residents is also a possibility. In Tallevast, it appears that Lock-
heed Martin controls the funds and medical monitoring program that it
has made available to the residents. If this is true, then Lockheed’s
handling of the funds and the terms of the medical monitoring program
should be reviewed by independent health professionals and actuaries
who are able to ensure that the allocated funds and duration of the pro-
ject as envisioned by Lockheed Martin match the need that has been
generated by the exposure.
While medical monitoring and screening is imperative for commu-
nities that have been exposed to contamination, medical treatment is the
true burden that must be lifted from the shoulders of the affected
communities. Ms. Ishmael indicated that in regard to the $2.6 million153
dollars that CATE sought to be compelled from Cononco-Philips, when
that money was to be allocated per community member, the per person
allotment amounted to $500.154 This is simply not sufficient to monitor
and treat a community that suffers from abnormally high rates of cancer
and other serious illnesses. Again, the amount of these rewards should
152 Interview with Francine Ishmael, Executive Director, CATE (Nov. 17, 2012).
153 At the time of that CATE brought suit to compel payment, the account had
accumulated $600,000 in interest.
154 Interview with Francine Ishmael, Executive Director, CATE (Nov. 17, 2012).
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be based on professional actuarial predictions that take into account the
high cost of health care.
Applying the process of overfiling, states would be given a reason-
able period of time to enforce the actual cleanup of the responsible
party. That reasonable time would need to be defined at the outset so as
to avoid wasting time and resources. A mandate or decree would have to
be issued by the federal agency. In that definition of the time period,
certain considerations would have to be made such as the size of the
project, the relocation efforts, the costs and available funding.
Unfortunately, the time to draw up the proposal may create delays.
While it is imperative that communities be removed from exposure
and that the cleanup process be completed, it is also necessary to ensure
that the lives and health of the residents are not irreparably disrupted.
The cleanup in Escambia was initially marked as an emergency cleanup
where the EPA came in and began to excavate contaminated soils.
While at first glance this seems like an appropriate show of decisive
action, the emergency cleanup methods actually caused the contamina-
tion to be spread throughout the communities and the residents reported
increases in acute illness such as skin rashes, nausea and headaches.155
Additionally, regarding the medical monitoring, it should be
explicitly stated that medical monitoring is only the first step and that
medical treatment, when necessary, is included as well. Medical moni-
toring is important, but is virtually meaningless without treatment for
those unable to pay for their treatment. Given the fact that EJ
communities are overwhelmingly low income communities, the
diagnoses are likely to go untreated without the additional funding for
the actual treatment for the diseases that have resulted from the exposure
to contamination.
In Tallevast, Lockheed Martin has funded medical monitoring.
However, it is unclear as to whether treatment is also offered. In many
instances, the residents are aware that they are ill. The true problem is
that they are left to determine how they are going to pay for the treat-
ment. For instance, many of the residents in Tallevast suffer from Beryl-
liosis, which come from working with Beryllium at the ABC plant. The
dust from beryllium affected the people who worked in the plant, as well
155 See Lerner, supra note 32, at 45; Abrams, supra note 140, at 45.
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as some of their family members who were exposed to the dust when the
workers came home from the plant. These people often need to use oxy-
gen tanks and medication for the rest of their lives.
3. Successful Relocation
“Successful relocation occurs when those who have been harmed
are happy, not worse off.”156
Permanent relocations are governed by the Uniform Relocation
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970.157
Relocation is considered as a last resort and will be included in a site
remedy only where the contamination poses a risk to human health that
cannot be addressed by other remediation activities such as those de-
vised by engineering solutions and restrictions on the polluters or where
the homes present an obstacle to the cleanup activities.158 As of 2000,
the EPA estimated that relocations had been included as part of only ap-
proximately seventeen sites.159
Lockheed Martin has told the residents of Tallevast that they will
no longer consider the issue of relocation.160 However, there is some
indication in news reports that some residents are still pressing for per-
manent relocation away from the toxic plume that, by Lockheed
Martin’s own calculations, will take fifty years to remediate.161 Health
studies conducted on the presence of cancer and other illnesses, as well
as on the connection of those illnesses to the contamination and expo-
sure in Tallevast, vary greatly depending on who conducts the survey.
This again shows the need for an objective party to conduct and/or over-
see the contamination and health assessments that compel the PRPs to
relocate the affected communities.
Once relocation is deemed necessary, it should be conducted care-
fully, yet swiftly so as to remove the residents from exposure while at
the same time ensuring that the needs of the community are met by
156 Interview with Francine Ishmael, Executive Director, CATE (Nov. 17, 2012).
157 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601- 4655.
158 See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 122.
159 Id.
160 Carl Mario Nudi, With No Relocation, Tallevast Disappointed,
BRANDENTON.COM (Oct. 2, 2009), available at http://www.bradenton.com/2009/
10/02/1749286/with-no-relocation-tallevast-disappointed.html.
161 Lockheed-Martin, Environmental Testing and Cleanup, LOCKHEED MARTIN,
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/tallevast/efforts.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2012).
2014]A TALE OF TWO CITIES: THE NEED FOR GREATER
FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT TO ENSURE PROPER NOTIFICATION,
MEDICAL MONITORING AND TREATMENT, AND SUCCESSFUL
RELOCATION FOR TALLEVAST, FLORIDA AND OTHER
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE COMMUNITIES 145
providing housing that is safe and secure. Ms. Ishmael discussed myriad
problems with the relocation effort that was conducted by the EPA and
the USACE. First, the USACE was using methods and standards that
had been taken from relocation of military bases.162 This standard is un-
fair and unacceptable. The communities that were moved in Escambia
County were residential, with many old ailing people. Additionally,
many of the residents were moved into homes that were worse than the
ones that they left.163 Ishmael reported one woman who complained of
noises coming from the furnace in her new home. When she had it
checked, at her own expense, it was discovered that the furnace was
leaking carbon monoxide into the home.164
The relocation of the Tallevast residents should have occurred long
ago. However, if the residents are fortunate enough to achieve relocation
at the expense of Lockheed Martin, or any other source, the process
should be designed with the lessons of Escambia County in mind. The
community should be consulted to determine the resident’s desires and
needs for housing. There should be multiple appraisals to ensure that fair
estimates are being given. Additionally, any relocation packages that are
offered in the form of monetary compensation and/or relocation services
should be designed to facilitate comfortable transitions that make the
residents whole, rather than exacerbate an already difficult time.
Conclusion
In recent years, Environmental Justice communities have rightfully
garnered greater attention from the larger civil rights and environmental
communities. However, the battles that environmental justice advocates
must fight are daunting and seemingly insurmountable. The de-
mographics of most Environmental Justice communities make them
susceptible to various forms of discrimination and maltreatment at the
hands of local and state governments who are engaged in the business of
162 Interview with Francine Ishmael, Executive Director, CATE (Nov. 17, 2012).
163 Escambia Wood Treating Company (ETC) Superfund Site Permanent
Relocation Focus Group Summary Report, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, available at
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/community/relocation/etc.pdf.
164 Interview with Francine Ishmael, Executive Director, CATE (Nov. 17, 2012).
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securing funding and attracting industry to bring revenue and notoriety
to the state. This “race to the bottom” has caused the state and local
governments to treat people as expendable. The disregard for human life
and for the environment is unforgiveable and inexcusable. Communities
must be protected from the hazards of contamination.
This article has proposed a solution that may help alleviate the suf-
fering in environmental justice communities. The power of oversight
should be taken from the hands of state officials and placed back into
the Federal government, which delegated the power in the first place. It
is only by circumventing the relationship that is created by the interplay
of state and local governments and industry that environmental justice
communities may find refuge from maltreatment.
The relocation of the communities surrounding Mount Dioxin was
touted as a success. The EPA conducted a series of focus groups to
assess the effectiveness of the relocation in Pensacola. According to the
EPA’s Focus Group Summary Report, the goal of the focus groups “was
to learn about the relocation experience from the perspective of the
residents, in order to improve future relocations.” This Summary Report
and others like it can be used to create roadmaps for community
cleanup, remediation and relocation that consider the wishes of the
community members, who are in the best position to inform the process.
Additionally, the involvement of community members would allow
efforts to draw upon the principles of environmental justice, which call
for community involvement. The proposal that has been outlined in this
article has attempted to incorporate the principles of environmental
justice into the existing legal framework to create a solution to some of
the problems that plague environmental justice communities.
